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AN UNHEALTHY NATION: WHY LOBBYING
RESTRICTIONS FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS DON'T MAKE SENSE
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Jack Abramoff, a now infamous lobbyist in the federal
government, was charged with exploiting the charitable tax
exemptions in an attempt to illegally influence Congressmen by
giving them seemingly permittable "charitable gifts."' Abramoff's
abuse of charitable organizations was well documented and
publicized in the news.2 Ignited by the Abramoff scandal, discussions
of greater oversight into lobbying activities of nonprofits have
increased. However, contrary to these views that more oversight is
necessary, the idea that certain charitable organizations should have
more freedom to lobby because of the important social function they
serve has been around for many years.
"[T]ax exemption is a privilege that is accorded only to
organizations that meet the requirements of the Code and the
Treasury regulations, including the requirement that their activities be
in the public interest." 5 The privileges granted to 501(c)(3) tax
exempt organizations include freedom from federal income tax and
the allowance of personal income tax deductibility by contributions
6
of donors. With these privileges come many costs to exempt
organizations, especially those whose mission includes advocacy. 7
1. Frances R. Hill, Congress's Charity Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A21.
2. See generally Philip Shenon, Panel Reports Fraud by Some Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2006, at A2 1; Editorial, The Whirl of the Political Casino, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A24.
3. See Stephanie Strom, New Equation for Charities: More Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2003, at Fl. Strom reports that the Internal Revenue Service has 800 employees monitoring the
activities of close to I million charities. Further, many state governments do not adequately monitor
small charities located within the state. Id.
4. See generally Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201,204 (1987).
5. Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's
Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1269, 1323 (1993).
6. I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (2006); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
7. See Mortimer M. Caplin & Richard E. Timbie, Legislative Activities of Public Charities, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 185 (1975).
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Some commentators suggest that it appears illogical to prevent
charitable organizations from promoting a mission of advocacy
through lobbying activities.' Many exempt organizations accomplish
their missions through legislative advocacy, such as promoting
legislation to ban smoking. 9 Other exempt organizations promote
numerous social and economic issues that are the direct subject of
many legislative proceedings. '
0
Many of the services that large charities provide to the government
are within the area of health and voluntary health services.11
"Voluntary health care charities," for purposes of this Note, are
categorized as those charities that are primarily organized and
operated to serve a health advocacy function. 12  As the nation
becomes increasingly unhealthy, health issues have shifted to the
forefront of the minds of many Americans.' 3 In 2004, health care
spending in America accounted for 15% of the economy, with
spending in excess of $1.55 trillion dollars. 14 Every day, government
officials, politicians, and legislators make decisions about numerous
health issues that impact the health of the nation. 15 However, under
the current Internal Revenue Code regulations, voluntary health care
charities are highly restricted in their attempts at advocating for
advancement of health-related legislation. 16
8. Galston, supra note 5, at 1322.
9. See generally AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 47 (2006),
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/CAFF2006PWSecured.pdf.
10. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 184.
11. See generally American Cancer Society, http://www.cancer.org (last visited June 14, 2008);
American Heart Association, http://www.americanheart.org (last visited June 14, 2008); American
Diabetes Association, http://www.diabetes.org (last visited June 14, 2008); American Lung Association,
http://www.lungusa.org (last visited June 14, 2008).
12. Examples of these organizations include: American Cancer Society, http://www.cancer.org (last
visited June 14, 2008); American Heart Association, http://www.americanheart.org (last visited June 14,
2008); American Diabetes Association, http://www.diabetes.org (last visited June 14, 2008); American
Lung Association, http://www.lungusa.org (last visited June 14, 2008).
13. See generally Nancy Hellmich, USA Wallowing in Unhealthy Ways, USA TODAY, Aug. 22,2002,
available at http./www.usatoday.com/news/health/2002-08-2 I-james.x.htm.
14. Robert Pear, Health Spending Rises to 15% of Economy, a Record Level, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2004, at A16.
15. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 47.
16. See I.R.C. § 501(cX3X2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), (d)(1) (as amended in 1990).
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The charitable exemption that 501(c)(3) tax exempt organizations
receive is only available if the organization is not operated for profit,
does not participate directly or indirectly in any political campaign on
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office, or if any
of the net earnings inure to the benefit of a private person or
shareholder. 17 Further, these organizations must be organized and
operated for tax exempt purposes and will lose their tax exempt status
if more than an insubstantial amount of their activities do not
coincide with this tax exempt purpose.' 8 Although advocacy by
charitable organizations "may not fit comfortably within the
narrowest and most traditional sense of 'charitable' enterprise, many
believe that the roles of advocate and improver of social systems,
empowerer of citizens, and critic and monitor of government policies
and programs are among the most crucial functions of the nonprofit
sector.
' 19
Many charitable organizations in the United States have "turned
their efforts to raising public awareness, demanding accountability
from governmental agencies, and pressing for changes in the law, all
in an attempt to serve the collective interests of those whose needs
are ill-served by the status quo."20 For many years, the existence of
tax exempt charities has been justified on the grounds that these
charities provide services to the government that are beyond the
ability of the government to provide.2
1
However, under the current lobbying restrictions, "it is not clear
just how much of what kind of activity, addressed to which social
issues, will so color the character of an organization that it no longer
qualifies for exemption and donor deductibility under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.",22 This Note will scrutinize
the inefficiency of current advocacy restrictions as applied to
voluntary health organizations and will propose a more efficient
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2), (d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1990).
19. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 205.
20. Id. at 204.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 207.
20081 1099
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approach to monitoring exempt organization advocacy. Part I of this
Note will give an overview of obtaining tax exempt status as a
501(c)(3), discuss the benefits and limitations that accompany tax
exempt status as a 501(c)(3) 23 and will discuss the organizational and
24operational tests. Part II of this Note will address the history of the
lobbying restrictions currently affecting 501 (c)(3) organizations,25 the
substantial part test and the expenditure test. 26 Part III of this Note
addresses the problems associated with the current lobbying
restrictions, including problems with 501(c)(3) organizations
funneling their lobbying activities within 501(c)(4) organizations and
policy reasons why the restrictions should be lifted for voluntary
27health care organizations.
Part IV will discuss the need to reform the current lobbying
restrictions as applied to voluntary health care organizations.28
Finally, this Note concludes that the present state of lobbying
restrictions is not justified in its application to voluntary health
organizations.29
I. OVERVIEW OF OBTAINING 501(c)(3) STATUS
The Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation many different
types of organizations. 30 There are roughly twenty-eight types of
organizations, including labor unions, trade associations, certain
fraternal societies, social welfare organizations, veterans groups, and
social clubs that are tax exempt.31 Charitable organizations, which are
23. See discussion infra Part I.A.
24. See discussion infra Part I.B.
25. See discussion infra Part lI.A.
26. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
27. See discussion infra Part Ii.
28. See discussion infra Part I.
29. See discussion infra Conclusion.
30. See generally I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
31. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(I)-(25) (2006) for more in-depth descriptions of these different
categories.
[Vol. 24:41100
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1100 2007-2008
  I IT   ( L  
  
    
,   
23 l  
   
 1  2s  
  
t   
   I  )( )  








I  I I    )  
 
 0  f 
 
,  
 ti ,  
.  is ssi  i fr  rt I. . 
 




.   fra . 
r l . . SOl . 
.  ll  . . .  SOI( )(l S) )   i t  i ti   t  t 
 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/5
AN UNHEALTHY NATION
organized and operated exclusively for a charitable purpose are
categorized as 501(c)(3) organizations under the Code.32
A. Benefits of Electing 501(c)(3) Status
The Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States
stated, "[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the
exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit that the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or that
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already
supported by tax revenues."
33
Obtaining section 501(c)(3) status is beneficial to organizations,
and thus desirable, because contributions made by a donor are tax
deductible, while contributions to other tax exempt organizations are
not deductible. 34 Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the IRC permits taxpayers
who contribute donations to 501(c)(3) organizations to deduct the
amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns.
35
Commentators have suggested that charitable status is a reflection on
donor's selections of particular philanthropic ideas that are of specific
worth to the public.36 Thus, charitable institutions deserve their tax
subsidy because of the public's influence and willingness to donate to
a particular cause. 37 There are other organizations designated under
the Code as tax exempt, such as the 501(c)(4) social welfare
organization. 38  However, despite receiving tax exempt status,
32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
33. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983). Bob Jones University was an
educational institution that discriminated on the basis of race. The Supreme Court determined that
Congress intended the IRS Code to meet common-law standards of charity. Because the university's
acts of discrimination were "contrary to public policy," the court refused to grant tax exempt status. Id.
at 595.
34. See generally I.R.C. § 170(b) (2006).
35. I.R.C. § 170(cX2)(D) (2006). I.R.C. § 501(c)(1)-(5) provide further contributions that can be
deducted.
36. See generally Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1384 (1991).
37. Id. at 1385.
38. The 501(c)(4) "social welfare organization" is explained and discussed in Part lII.A of this Note.
20081
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501(c)(4) organizations may not be as desirable an option because
contributions to these organizations are not deductible.39
B. Organizational and Operational Tests
In order to obtain tax exempt status as a 501(c)(3), an organization
must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more tax
exempt purposes.40 If an organization fails to meet either of these two
tests, it will not obtain a tax exempt status.4 1 Under the organizational
test, the 501(c)(3) exempt organization must be organized exclusively
for one or more exempt purpose. 42 The organization is exempt only if
its articles of organization "[1]imit the purposes of [the] organization
to one or more exempt purposes. 43 Moreover, the 501(c)(3) exempt
organization is expressly denied the power "to engage, otherwise than
as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in
themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.
'44
Thus, an organization is not considered organized exclusively for one
or more exempt purposes if its articles expressly empower it to carry
out, in more than an insubstantial amount, any activities that are not
in furtherance of their exempt purposes.45
39. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(2006).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)- l(a) (as amended in 1990). The actual text of the Internal Revenue
Code reads:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.
I.R.C § 501(c) (2006).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1990).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (as amended in 1990).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(lXi)(a) (as amended in 1990).
44. Treas. Reg. § i.501(cX3)-l(b)(l)(i)(b) (as amended in 1990).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)(2)(iii)l.501(c)(3)-i(a)(2)(b)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
[Vol. 24:41102
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1102 2007-2008
 I   I ERSITY  I  ( l. :4 
)( )   ir le ti   
ti  t  i ti s t l .39 
izational tional  
   t  ), i tion 
  i l    
t 40  ti  t r   
t S 41  i ti al 
)(3) t i ti  t i ed i ly 
t .42  i ti n    
 ti  l it   ti  
 t s.,,43 , ( )(3) t 
ti    ,   
    
l s  t i  f rt era ce of one or more exempt purposes.'M 
 r   i l   
     
   
  45 
1 ) (  
  I  t  t l  
 
it    
 t , lit ,  
,    t  t  titi  
   
 
m l r  
  ,   
tt ti , t  i l  l i l ti  ( t s t r is  r i  i  s s ti  ( », a  
 i   t  li i   i t i ti     
 
 . 
I ( )-l(a)(I)   
.  I X )-I    i  . 
.  I (c)(3)-1 1 Xi)(a)   i  . 
1. I I    . 
 I(c)(3)-I( )( iii)1.  (c)(3)-i (a)(2)(b)( ii)   i  . 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/5
AN UNHEALTHY NATION
Under the operational test, an organization will be regarded as
"operated exclusively" for "one or more exempt purposes only if it
engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such
exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). '' 6 An organization is
not regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purpose
"if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in
furtherance of an exempt purpose. ' 47 Further, the presence of a
single, significant non-exempt purpose will disqualify the
organization under the operational test.48 The Code specifies a section
for organizations that attempt to influence legislation as a substantial
part of their activities. 4 9 These types of organizations, deemed
"action" organizations, cannot receive tax exempt status under
section 501(c)(3) of the Code, but may qualify as a social welfare
organization under 501 (c)(4).5 °
501(c)(3) organizations are only considered to be organized and
operated exclusively for one or more tax exempt purpose if they
serve a public, rather than a private, interest.51 To meet this
requirement, the organization must establish that it is "not organized
or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the
organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly by such
private interests." 52 Moreover, the net income of the 501(c)(3) cannot
inure, in whole or in part, "to the benefit of any private shareholder or
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990).
47. Id.
48. See Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
("[T]he presence of a single [non-exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption
regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes."). See also Church By Mail, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 765 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the Church was operated
for a substantial non-exempt purpose of providing a market for an advertising service); Hutchinson
Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 696 F.2d 757, 763 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding
that a non-profit organization promoting recreational and amateur athletics had a substantial non-exempt
purpose of promoting an amateur baseball team).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(cX3)(i), (iii), (iv) (as amended in 1990); I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
(2006); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
52. Id.
20081 1103
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individual., 53  Finally, no substantial part of the organization's
activities may be attempts to influence legislation or participate in
political candidate campaigns.5
4
II. OVERVIEW OF LOBBYING RESTRICTIONS
A. History of Lobbying Restrictions
Federal tax law limits the amount of legislative and political
activities of charitable 501(c)(3) organizations in two ways." First,
charities may lose their tax exempt status if they engage in a
substantial amount of legislative lobbying. 6 Second, charities may
not participate in political campaigns on behalf of candidates for
office.5 7 Congress passed the first lobbying restrictions applicable to
tax exempt organizations in 1934, when it stated that "no substantial
part of the activities" of a tax exempt corporation or foundation may
consist of "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation.,
58
B. Tests of Lobbying Activity
There are two main regimes that apply to the lobbying activities of
public charities.5 9 These regimes, considered "tests" of lobbying
activities, are the substantial part test and the expenditure test.6 °
53. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982) (Private
shareholders are defined as a person or "persons having a personal or private interest in the activities of
the organization."); East Tennessee Artificial Breeders Assoc. v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) P9748 (1963) (defining "inurement" as "use; user-, service to the or benefit of a person.").
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-l(bX3Xii) (as amended in 1990).
55. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 101(6) (1934). Introduced by Senator David Reed
of Pennsylvania, this amendment was born from the need to protect charitable donors from inadvertently
financing political activities. See generally Deborah J. Zimmerman, Branch Ministries Inc. v. Rossotti:
First Amendment Considerations to Loss of Tax Exemption, 30 N. KY. L. REv. 249, 252 (2003)
(discussing 501 (c)(3) tax exemptions).
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1. Substantial Part Test
The substantial part test requires that a 501(c)(3) organization not
devote more than an "insubstantial part of its activities to attempting
to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise; or directly or
indirectly to participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of or
in opposition to any candidate for public office .... "61 To do any of
these things would characterize the 501(c)(3) as an action
62
organization, terminating its tax exempt status. Currently, there is
little guidance for tax exempt organizations to determine what level




The expenditure test is outlined in Section 501(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code.64 Section 501(h) and 4911 of the Internal Revenue
Code were added as amendments in 1976 and were "seen as an
important step in the direction of curing the faults of the pre-1976
substantiality test [the substantial part test]." 65 As opposed to the
substantial part test, if a charitable organization elects the expenditure
test as a substitute, a strict limit is imposed on the amount of money
the 501(c)(3) can spend in an effort to influence legislation.66 Many
public charities elect the expenditure test instead of the substantial
part test to determine their allowable expenditures to influence
legislation.
67
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3)(i)-(iii) (as amended in 1990).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
63. Guidance for exempt organizations on the meaning of "substantial" has been unpredictable. See
discussion infra Part HI.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h) (as amended in 1990).
65. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 225.
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-1(3) (as amended 1990); I.R.C. § 491 1(c)(2) (2006) (currently, this limit
is $1,000,000).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-i(a)(2) (as amended 1990).
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Under a specific formula, a public charity that elects 501(h) status
can make lobbying expenditures within specified dollar limits.68 By
remaining within these certain limits, "the electing public charity will
not owe tax under section 4911 nor will it lose its tax exempt status
as a charity." 69 These limits are determined on a scale of the fraction
of the total expenditures the charity makes within a year in support of
its exempt purpose. 70 "Lobbying expenditures" are amounts spent to
influence legislation.71 "Influencing legislation" is "any attempt to
influence any legislation" either "through an attempt to affect the
opinions of the general public or any segment thereof,"72 or "through
communication with any member or employee of a legislative body,
or with any government official or employee who may participate in
the formulation of the legislation."
73
The expenditure test also distinguishes between direct lobbying
and grassroots lobbying.74 As opposed to direct lobbying, which is
aimed at legislators, grassroots lobbying is an "attempt[] to urge or
encourage the public to contact members of a legislative body for the
purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation." 75
Expenses on grassroots lobbying cannot exceed one-fourth of the
total lobbying percentage limitation.76 An exempt organization will
be forced to pay an excess expenditure tax in the event that they have
"excess lobbying expenditures," which occurs when either the
amount of lobbying expenditures exceed the lobbying nontaxable
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-i(a)(3) (as amended 1990).
69. Id.
70. See I.R.C. § 491 1(c)(2) (2006). The yearly percentage limits are the lesser of $1,000,000 or: 20%
for the first $500,000 of exempt purpose expenditures; $100,000 plus 15% of the second $500,000 of
exempt purpose expenditures; $175,000 plus 10% of the exempt purpose expenditures; or $225,000 plus
5% of exempt purpose expenditures exceeding $1,500,000. Id.
71. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(1) (2006).
72. I.R.C. § 491 l(d)(1)(A) (2006).
73. I.R.C. § 491 l(d)(1)(B) (2006).
74. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1990).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(4) (as amended in 1995).
76. I.R.C. § 491 l(c)(4) (2006).
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amount,77 or the amount of grassroots expenditures exceed the
grassroots nontaxable amount.78
C. Constitutionality of Lobbying Restrictions
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
lobbying restrictions imposed on section 501(c)(3) organizations in
the case of Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington.79
Taxation With Representation was an organization which sought to
promote its view of "public interest" in the federal taxation arena and
was formed to take over two nonprofit organizations. 8° The first
corporation, Taxation With Representation Fund, promoted the
public interest through litigation and the publication of a journal, and
had tax exempt status as a 501(c)(3) organization.8' The second
organization, Taxation With Representation, was formed primarily
for influencing legislation and had tax exempt status as a 501(c)(4)
organization. 82 Taxation With Representation attacked the lobbying
restrictions for its 501 (c)(3) organization because it sought to use the
tax deductible contributions to support the substantial lobbying
activities of the 501(c)(4) organization. 83 The Internal Revenue
Service denied Taxation With Representation tax exempt status
because more than a substantial part of its activities included attempts
to influence legislation.
84
After losing its tax exempt status, Taxation With Representation
challenged the 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions and claimed that the
prohibition of substantial lobbying was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. 85  Taxation With Representation sued the
77. I.R.C. § 491 l(b)(l) (2006).
78. I.R.C. § 491 1(b)(2) (2006).
79. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
80. Id. at 543.
81. Id.
82. Id. As discussed in Part UI.A. of this Note, a 501(c)(4) organization is a "social welfare
organization" which is also a tax exempt organization, but unlike a 501(c)(3) organization, any
donations to a 501(c)(4) are not tax deductible.
83. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. at 543-44.
84. Id. at 542.
85. Id.
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Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the United States seeking a declaratory judgment that
their organization should be granted 501(c)(3) tax exempt status.86
The Supreme Court affirmed the IRS's denial of tax exempt status
because a substantial part of its intended activities would consist of
attempts to influence legislation. 87 The Court focused on two
important principles: (1) the First Amendment does not require the
government to subsidize lobbying, and (2) "a legislature's decision
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe
that right."88
The Court explained that both tax exemptions and tax deductions
are essentially a government subsidy of an organization.89 In essence,
a tax exemption operates as a cash grant from the government to an
organization. 9° Moreover, "[t]he system Congress has enacted
provides this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations
generally, and an additional subsidy to those charitable organizations
that do not engage in substantial lobbying." 9' Thus, Congress made a
conscious decision to not subsidize the political activities of charities
as much as charities' other activities.
92
The Court held that Taxation With Representation could still
obtain tax exemption as a 501(c)(4) organization; however it would
have to ensure that the 501(c)(3) organization did not subsidize the
501(c)(4) organization because "otherwise, public funds might be
spent on an activity Congress chose not to subsidize." 93 The Court
indicated that by requiring an exempt organization to conduct all of
its lobbying activities through a 501(c)(4), it prevents the public
subsidy of lobbying without requiring the parent organization to be
86. Id.
87. Id. at 550.
88. Id. at 549.
89. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. at 544.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 550.
93. Id. at 544.
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forced to forego all lobbying or give up the public subsidy of
deductibility for its other activities.94
Taxation With Representation argued that despite the availability
of a 501(c)(4) structural option, the IRS imposed onerous
requirements on these organizations, which "effectively make it
impossible for a § 501(c)(3) organization to establish a § 501(c)(4)
lobbying affiliate." 95 However, the Court indicated that the IRS only
required the 501(c)(3) organization and the 501(c)(4) "sister"
organization to be separately incorporated and maintain clear records
indicating that all tax-deductible contributions of the 501(c)(3) were
not used for lobbying.96 The Court said these requirements were "not
unduly burdensome. 97
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. Creating a "Sister" 501(c) (4) Organization May Not Be The Best
Option
As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court concluded
in Regan v. Taxation With Representation that there is no penalty
imposed by the lobbying restrictions of 501(c)(3) organizations
because a 501(c)(3) organization that wishes to advocate can house
all of these activities within a 501(c)(4) sister organization. 98 By
isolating lobbying activities within a 501(c)(4), the exempt
organization could continue to receive tax deductions on all of its
funds, except for the lobbying activities.99 Many charitable
organizations form 501(c)(4) entities to promote a particular cause,
including proposing legislation and endorsing political candidates
who share the views of the organization.'
00
94. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, .., concurring).
95. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of, Washington, 461 U.S. at 544.
99. Id.
100. Charles E. Hodges II & Edward M. Manigault, Political Activity and Lobbying By Charities:
How Far Can it Go? What are the Risks? J. TAX'N, Sep. 2000, at 182.
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A 501(c)(4) organization is a social welfare organization that is
exempt from taxation. 10 1 The main difference between classification
as a 501(c)(3) entity and a 501(c)(4) entity is that a 501(c)(3) allows
for personal income tax deductibility of contributions by donors
under § 170(c)(2), while donors to a 501(c)(4) may not deduct these
contributions. 102  However, unlike a 501(c)(3), a 501(c)(4)
organization has no restrictions on lobbying and does not have to
refrain from attempting to influence legislation. 0 3 In fact, the IRS has
held that a 501 (c)(4) organization may carry on political activities.1 0 4
An organization that is considered an "action" organization may still
qualify for tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) of the Code.10 5
Although the Court in Taxation With Representation indicated that by
funneling lobbying activities into a 501(c)(4) sister organization, the
501(c)(3) does not have to choose between free speech or
deductibility for its other activities, 10 6 this method of lobbying
through a 501(c)(4) organization presents two key problems. 10 7
First, establishing a 501 (c)(4) entity requires that certain standards
be met.'0 8 A 501(c)(4) should be separately organized and established
under state law, should maintain separate bank accounts, and should
keep separate records from the 501(c)(3).' 0 9 In addition, the 501(c)(3)
and 501(c)(4) should allocate key employees such as officers and
directors, as well as shared goods, services, and facilities so as to not
101. Section 501 (c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts organizations that are "operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (1982). "Social
welfare" is defined to be "the common good and general welfare of the people of a
community" and "bringing about civic betterments and social improvements." Treas. Reg. §
1.501 (c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2007).
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2007).
104. SeeRev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
105. See supra Part II.
106. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (discussing the majority's holding).
107. See discussion infra Part Il1.
108. See Hodges II & Manigault, supra note 100, at 182.
109. Internal Revenue Service, Fiscal 2000 CPE Text for Exempt Organizations, Chapter S,
Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying, and Educational Organizations, 1999 TNT 169-30, at par. 15
(Sept. 1, 1999).
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risk the status of the 501 (c)(3)."° If a 501 (c)(4) entity affiliated with
a 501(c)(3) fails to observe all the formalities of separate
organizational status, its activities may be considered those of the
501(c)(3) organization, especially if the 501(c)(3) provides any
subsidy."' A 501 (c)(3) may jeopardize its own exempt status and be
characterized as non-charitable if its affiliation with a 501(c)(4) is
used to conceal a primary purpose of advocacy." 12
Second, by forcing exempt organizations to house all of their
advocacy within a 501(c)(4), it withholds incentives for donors to
contribute deductible donations." 3 Contributors to a 501(c)(4)
organization cannot deduct their donations on their individual income
tax returns. 114 Although a 501(c)(3) organization may be able to
house lobbying activity within a 501(c)(4), without the ability to
receive deductible contributions, a great portion of the organization's
funds may dissipate 115 and the 501(c)(4) may not be able to
financially maintain its existence. 1
16
B. The Obscure Meaning of "Substantial" and Problems with
501(h) Election
A second problem with the current restrictions on charitable
lobbying is that there is no simple rule as to what amount of lobbying
activity is considered to be "substantial."' 17 Exempt organizations
operating advocacy activities under the substantial part test may find
it extremely difficult to gauge the amount of permissible lobbying
activities. 118 Further, guidance on an allowable amount of advocacy
activity from the judicial opinions has been varied and
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 239.
113. See generally Galston, supra note 5.
114. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (limiting the types of organizations to which donors can make a charitable
contribution).
115. See James H. Fogel, To the IRS, Tis Better to Give than to Lobby, 61 A.B.A. J. 960, 961 (1975).
116. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 195.
117. See id. at 183-84. See generally Galston, supra note 5, at 1279.
118. See discussion infra Part HI.B.
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unpredictable."l 9 For example, in Haswell v. United States, the
United States Court of Claims used a percentage test to determine
that an organization's lobbying activities were substantial, thus
causing the organization to lose its tax exempt status. 120 In Haswell,
the court held that the organization engaged in substantial lobbying
activity when 16-20% of its expenditures were used for lobbying and
the legislative program was an important part of the organization's
agenda. 12 1 Utilizing the same percentage test, the Sixth Circuit in
Seasongood v. Commissioner held that lobbying by an organization
was not substantial when it accounted for less than 5% of its
expenditures. 1
22
However, the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes National Ministry,
Inc. v. United States used a much broader test to determine if an
organization's lobbying activities were substantial:
The political activities of an organization must be balanced in the
context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization
to determine whether a substantial part of its activities was to
influence or attempt to influence legislation. A percentage test to
determine whether the activities were substantial obscures the
complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation
to its objectives and circumstances. 123
Consequently, charities making a good faith attempt to comply with
the "substantial part" test are left with vague and uncertain
standards. 1
24
Under the "substantial part" test, a charity may participate in some
lobbying activities; however, because of the lack of coherent
119. Compare Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. CI. 1974), with Seasongood v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 227 F.2d 907, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1955).
120. Haswell, 500 F.3d at 1146.
121. Id. at 1146-47.
122. Seasongood, 227 F.2d at 912.
123. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972)
(citation omitted).
124. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 195.
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standards governing what is "substantial," there is an undue
administrative burden on all concerned. 125 A charity that wishes to
participate in legislative activity must first determine what constitutes
legislative activity within the Code and then look to unpredictable
standards to determine if these activities are substantial. 126
To determine if a charity in question is within the allowable limits
of lobbying activity, the Internal Revenue Service must investigate
the facts and circumstances of each case and make numerous factual
and legal judgments. 12 7 Given that the Internal Revenue Service
currently has 800 employees in charge of monitoring close to one
million charities, this does not appear to be an easy feat. 128 Moreover,
because the lines of allowable lobbying activity are so blurred, many
charities will simply avoid participation fearing revocation of their
status. 129
Although there is much uncertainty as to the extent of lobbying
activity that would jeopardize an organization's tax exempt status
under the "substantial part" test, a principal advantage of electing
501(h) status, allowing lobbying activities measured in accordance
with the expenditure test, are the clearer, bright-line rules regarding
permissible amounts of lobbying activities.1 30 However, large public
charities may find the annual $1 million limit for total lobbying
expenditures highly restraining to the organization's attempts at
advocacy.131
125. See id. at 191.
126. Id. at 195.
127. Id. at 194.
128. See Stephanie Strom, New Equation for Charities: More Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2003, at F1.
129. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 185.
130. See discussion supra Part II.B.
131. While $1 million is not an insubstantial amount of money, for an organization such as the
American Cancer Society, with annual revenues close to $1 billion, electing 501(h) status would limit
the organization's lobbying efforts to 1/1,000 of their annual income. Moreover, if 1/1,000 of the
organization's income was attributed to lobbying efforts, this amount does not seem to be so
"substantial" as to jeopardize the organization's status under the "substantial part" test. See generally
American Cancer Society, IRS Form 990 Return for National Home Office (2005),
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/AA/content/AA_17_NationalHomeOfficeForm_990_2005_PDF.as
p; American Cancer Society, IRS Form 990 Group return for Consolidated Divisions (2005),
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/AA/GroupFY05990.pdf.
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C. Public Policy Considerations
One large paradox of the current lobbying restrictions is that to
meet the requirements of a tax exempt, charitable organization, the
organization must be organized to promote public rather than private
interests. 132 However, because exempt organizations, rather than
businesses, are restricted in their lobbying efforts, the Code's
restrictions have made it "more onerous for organizations formed to
promote the public interest and more generous for entities formed to
serve private or commercial interests .... 9433
The issues that public charities promote are varied; however, these
issues are generally the subjects of legislative process in both state
and national government.' 34 Voluntary health care organizations feel
the impact of legislative decisions on matters such as funding for
research, health care regulations, and ensuring that all social classes
in society have access to some degree of health care.' 35 Some
important goals of health care organizations are achieved only
through legislation. 136  For example, many state and local
governments have recently enacted smoking bans to prevent smoking
in public places.' 37 Smoking cessation is a goal of the American
Cancer Society, 138 a goal achieved in large part with the aid of
legislative activity.1
39
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(ii) (2007).
133. See Galston, supra note 5, at 1271-72. Galston argues that the role of legislators is to determine
what actions or policies will benefit the community as a whole, to not only to implement, but also to
discover, legislative choices. Galston argues generally that charities should have even greater access to
lobbying because they can more accurately transmit to legislators "the existence, extent, and intensity of
constituent preferences." Id. at 1337.
134. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 197.
135. Id. Even non-health related charities, such as educational institutions, are greatly impacted by
legislative activities in areas such as improving the quality of public education. Id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 MO. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 94 (2005).
138. American Cancer Society, Cancer Facts and Figures 46 (2006),
http'./www.cancer.org/downloads/STr/CAFF2005f4PWSecured.pdf.
139. See generally Mark J. Horvick, Examining the Underlying Purposes of Municipal and Statewide
Smoking Bans, 80 IND. L. J. 923 (2005).
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Some commentators suggest that lobbying restrictions "effectively
den[y]" charities access to pursue their charitable purpose. 140
Moreover, some commentators advocate the removal of all lobbying
restrictions. 14 1 A fundamental aspect of a democratic government is
ensuring that legislation benefits society as a whole, accounting for
the viewpoints of all members of society. 142 Legislators not only
receive input from individual citizens, but also from groups informed
about the issues.' 43 In this respect, charities, especially voluntary
health care charities, may be in the best position to provide
meaningful assistance to legislators when drafting legislation related
to social problems. 144 Voluntary health care charities, organized and
operated exclusively for their charitable purpose can offer guidance
and information for legislators implementing programs to better the
health and wellbeing of society.
145
Historically, commentators have put forth several arguments
contending that exempt organizations should forego legislative
activity because of their exempt status. 146 One major argument
against legislative activities by tax exempt organizations is that
government should not subsidize participation in politics, giving
charitable organizations an upper-hand over their for-profit peers. 14
7
Without being restricted in their lobbying activities, exempt
organizations' activities may jeopardize government neutrality. 48
Congress made a clear policy choice to avoid subsiding political
activity through tax benefits given to charities. 14 9 Further, advocates
140. Caplin & Timbie, supra note 7, at 197.
141. See Fogel, supra note 115, at 961 (espousing that society needs a countervailing view of
businesses and added information from charities, acting as unbiased sources, which can aid legislators in
arriving at more informed decisions. A percentage limitation of legislative activities is in direct
opposition to Congress's justification for charitable exemptions.)




146. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 247.
147. Id. at249-50.
148. See Theodore L. Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest and
Educational Organizations, 59 GEO. L.J. 561, 583 (1971).
149. Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 308, 315 (1990).
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of this "neutrality" argument posit that certain charitable
organizations would have a much stronger voice in the legislative
arena, giving certain organizations an unfair advantage.' 
50
The current system of lobbying restrictions "is not really neutral at
all."'151 Businesses are able to deduct any lobbying expenses that
"bear a direct relationship to the [organization].' 52  However,
businesses are not able to deduct lobbying expenditures if there is too
attenuated a connection between the legislation and the welfare of the
business. 153 Because the lobbying restrictions are much more arduous
as applied to charitable organizations, the restrictions create both an
easier and cheaper method for businesses to lobby. 1
54
Although critics suggest that engaging in social activism and
advocacy "distorts and demeans the charitable mission," many in the
nonprofit sector appear to support tax exempt, charitable
organizations advocating their missions. 155 Under common law,
political activities as a means to accomplish a charitable goal do not
cause an organization to be considered "non-charitable."' 156 For
example, a charity organized and operated to relieve poverty may
further their mission by endorsing a political candidate who may
support legislation for the homeless. 157 It is hard to see how this
lobbying activity is not a charitable activity.158
Historically, within a modem democracy, it is a challenge for
legislators to remain current on all of the varied issues put before
them. 159 Given the present health of American citizens, it appears that
150. See Theodore L. Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest and
Educational Organizations, 59 GEO. L.J. 561, 584-85 (1971).
151. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 250.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(b) (2007).
153. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(b)(1)(i) (2007). However, no deductions are allowed for political
campaign activities or for lobbying in connection with nominations, appointments, or referenda. Treas.
Reg. § 1. 162-20(c)(4) (2007). Id
154. See Galston, supra note 5, at 1271-72.
155. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 248.
156. Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by
Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (2007).
157. See id. at 1090.
158. Seeid. at 1091.
159. See generally Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law
of Charities, 46 VA. L. REv. 439 (1960).
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legislators may be in need of guidance and support from health care
advocates. 160 The United States "spend[s] more per capita on health
care than any other developed country."' 6 1 Yet, as evidence of a
health care system in need of reform, the United States does not even
rank in the top twenty nations for life expectancy measured in healthy
years. 162 Charitable voluntary health organizations are in a unique
position to provide both social services and advocate for the health
and well-being of the nation. 163 Being organized and operated
exclusively for the public good' 64 may in fact put voluntary health
organizations in a uniquely beneficial position to monitor and
advocate for government policies and programs. 1
65
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM
As the Supreme Court stated in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, "Congress ... not... this Court... has the authority
to determine whether the advantage the public would receive from
additional lobbying by charities is worth the [additional] money the
public would pay to subsidize that lobbying, and other disadvantages
that might accompany that lobbying." 166 Congress has broad
discretion in the field of taxation, and the presumption of
constitutionality of a tax statute cannot be overcome unless there is
an explicit demonstration that the classification is "hostile and
oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes."'
167
The Supreme Court clearly stated that it is up to Congress to decide
which charities are worthy of subsidized lobbying.' 68 Congress
160. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
161. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Op-Ed, The Health of Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004,
§ 4, available at 2004 WLNR 4785821.
162. Id. According to the article, the United States comes in "an embarrassing 29th, sandwiched
between Slovenia and Portugal." Id.
163. Chisolm, supra note 4, at 205.
164. See generally infra Part LA (describing the organizational and operational tests).
165. See generally Chisoln, supra note 4, at 205.
166. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1982).
167. Id. at 547.
168. Id. at 550.
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subsidizing lobbying for veteran's organizations are viewed as a
legitimate policy because veterans have "been obliged to drop their
own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation."' 169 Thus, Congress
must determine whether voluntary health care organizations are vital
and worthy enough to the country to obtain similar lobbying
treatment. 
170
If voluntary health care charities had the opportunity to increase
their lobbying activities in support of a public mission of health they
may be able to "fill a void left by the purely political, and
depressingly bureaucratic, operations of government."' 171 With
increased abilities to lobby, large voluntary health care organizations,
such as the American Cancer Society, would be particularly
influential in political health care advocacy because of its financial
resources and ability to coordinate health care action on a national
level. 172
Lobbying restrictions promote the integrity of nonprofits by
ensuring that they do not cease from operating a public interest
mission.173 However, the complexity of the current lobbying rules
and the cost of compliance may cause some organizations to forgo
using their political voice. 174 While increasing the lobbying ability of
voluntary health care organizations may help improve the health of
the nation, a concern remains that increased lobbying may further "a
private interest more than insubstantially ... [through] exploitation of
a charitable entity for private purposes."' 75 If Congress passed
legislation that allowed voluntary health care charities, or any
charities for that matter, to have more flexibility in their lobbying
169. Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id.
171. Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by
Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1071, 1093 (2007). Similar arguments have
been made to liberalize advocacy restrictions for religious institutions as churches and other faith-based
organizations are voluntary associations that engage in character building and thus, deserve additional
privileges of federal tax law. Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 396 (2004).
172. See id. at 360.
173. Id. at 402.
174. Id.
175. Buckles, supra note 171, at 1092.
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activities, the risk remains that the charity will no longer promote a
public interest. 176 If any legislation were to be proposed it would be
necessary for Congress to "protect the integrity of the charitable
sector without unnecessarily stifling its political voice."'
177
If Congress relaxed the prohibition of political activities for
voluntary health care charities, the possibility exists that there could
be an increased partnership between the government and the
charitable sector in ameliorating the health care crises in the United
States.178 Although Congress treats voluntary health care charities the
same as any other organization operated for a charitable purpose, the
meaningful contributions certain voluntary health care charities make
to benefit society may justify relaxed lobbying restrictions.'
CONCLUSION
Lobbying restrictions on charitable voluntary health organizations
simply do not make sense.' 80 Under the Code regulations, charitable
voluntary health organizations are severely restricted in their
advocacy efforts,' 81 yet these organizations are in the best position to
advocate for the health of Americans.' 8
2
The United States is an unhealthy nation that spends over one
billion dollars each year on health care. 183 Within the United States,
there are many charitable voluntary health organizations dedicated to
improving the health of Americans. 1
84
The two current legislative activity regimes, the substantial part
test and the 501(h) election, are both lacking.' 85 The substantial part
176. Id.
177. Id. Whether liberalization of lobbying rules for voluntary health care organizations is
constitutional or prohibited is beyond the scope of this Note.
178. See Buckles, supra note 171, at 1094-1096.
179. See supra notes 169-179 and accompanying text.
180. See discussion supra Part II.
181. See discussion supra Part H.B.
182. See discussion supra Part III.C.
183. See discussion supra Introduction.
184. See id.
185. See discussion supra Part l.B.
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test offers an obscure meaning of "substantial" which provides little
guidance and makes lobbying by charitable organizations too
onerous. 186 The 501(h) election, while providing a clear monetary
limit on allowable legislative activity, is limited to a $1 million dollar
annual expenditure, which is much too small to promote the
advocacy efforts by organizations, such as the American Cancer
Society with annual revenues close to $1 billion dollars.' 87
Although the Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation affirmed that 501(c)(3) organizations may house their
lobbying activities within a 501(c)(4) "social welfare" organization;
this may not always be a good option for large charities.188 Forming a
501(c)(4) organization does not clarify the obscure meaning of how
much activity is "substantial.' 89 Moreover, due to the technicalities
that exist for proper creation and maintenance of a 501(c)(4), many
charities will find this option administratively burdensome and may
opt to forego any lobbying activities.
190
Further, the benefits of allowing voluntary health organizations to
lobby outweigh the risks. 191 Voluntary health organizations are in the
best position to inform legislators and advocate for the health of
Americans.' 9 2 Although the limitations on political activities by
charities are well-rooted in the legislative history of 501(c)(3)
organizations, after considering the current health care crisis in the
United States, it may be time that the limitations are reconsidered. 1
93
Catherine Hammer
186. See discussion supra Part lII.A.
187. See discussion supra Part I.B.
188. See discussion supra Part HI.A.
189. See id.
190. See discussion supra Part III.A.
191. See discussion supra Part HI.C.
192. See id.
193. See discussion supra Part IV.
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